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PLATO'S IDEAL AND THE PERVERSITY 
OF POLITICS 
Mark G. Yudof* 
EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTMSM. By Michael A. Rebell and Arthur R. 
Block. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1982. Pp. xv, 
319. $23. 
It will help us to cherish Plato's ideal, without sharing his hasty conclusion 
about the perversity of those who do not listen to reason. 1 
Educational Policy Making and the Courts, as its subtitle suggests, is 
much less concerned with demarcating the boundaries of judicial interven-
tion in public school controversies than it is with exploring, from an empiri-
cal perspective, the competing assertions frequently made by proponents 
and opponents of judicial activism. The education sphere, in the light of 
the controversial nature of many judicial decisions involving teacher senior-
ity, school finance, student rights, bilingual education, and the like, pro-
vides a convenient and appropriate context in which to test various 
hypotheses on the capabilities of courts and the legitimacy of their decisions 
(p. xi).2 The authors are extremely ambitious. They seek to close the "gap 
between theoretical debates about judicial activism and empirical research 
into actual trial court behavior'' (p. xii). If the book does not entirely suc-
ceed, and it does not, this does not detract from the pathbreaking nature of 
the enterprise. Others may build on their research, refining the methodol-
ogy and more carefully delineating the limits of empirical research with 
respect to the vexing normative issues of judicial activism. 
I. 
Rebell and Block were influenced by the views of Abram Chayes, who 
warmly endorses the book on the dust cover, and in many respects the book 
attempts to test empirically assertions made by Chayes in his perceptive 
1976 article in the Harvard Law Review.3 Chayes suggested that the courts 
have entered a new era of public law litigation and that this type of litiga-
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Marrs McLean Profes-
sor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. - Ed. 
1. W. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 261 (1965). 
2. See, e.g., R. ELMORE & M. McLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND RETRENCHMENT: THE Pou-
TICS OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1982); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND 
SOCIAL POLICY (1977); R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1978); LIMITS OF JUSTICE. (H. 
Kalodner & J. Fishman eds. 1978). 
3. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
See also Chayes, Foreword· Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1982). 
730 
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tion, involving the operation of public policy and complex institutions, con-
trasts markedly with traditional litigation involving only disputes between 
private individuals about private rights (p. 4). Traditional litigation is "bi-
polar" (involving two opposing interests) and "retrospective" (liability turns 
on events that have already occurred). The remedies flow naturally from 
the rights, with the impact of a remedy largely being limited to- the immedi-
ate parties. Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall's dictum on the separa-
tion of rights and remedies in Marbury v. Madison,4 traditional litigation 
treats them as highly interdependent. Corbin was more accurate when he 
said that "[i]n the whole field of law there is no right without a rem-
edy. . . . [T]he only useful test as to the existence of a right is that some 
legal remedy is provided."5 
The "new model" litigation departs significantly from these generaliza-
tions. The litigation is "multipolar," involving many parties and interests, 
and the aim is frequently to correct systemic wrongs in complex institu-
tional settings,6 e.g., mental hospitals, public schools, and police depart-
ments. The focus may be on group rights (blacks, prisoners, students) more 
than on individual hurts.7 Given the nature of the wrongs, predictions as to 
future occurrences are as important as past events, and the remedies are 
often broad and require significant changes over time in institutional regu-
larities. Remedies do not flow inexorably from the wrongs,8 and the impact 
of a court order usually will be felt more widely than in traditional law 
suits. In order to deal adequately with the factual complexities and to ease 
the process of implementation,9 decrees are often negotiated by the parties. 
The judge's role then becomes more one of orchestrating the proceedings, 
prodding the parties to agree, and building support among the relevant in-
terest groups, than one of a neutral umpire mandating a particular 
remedy. 10 
Professor Chayes' article is largely descriptive, and its primary contribu-
tion lay in articulating, organizing, and synthesizing changes in the judicial 
process that lawyers, judges, and scholars only inchoately understood. 
While the new model does not describe all modern litigations, it focuses 
attention on the differences in decisional processes between traditional pri-
4. 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803). 
5. 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 2 (1964). 
6. See generally Symposium: Legal Remedies in a Society of Large-Scale Organizations, 
1981 W1s. L. REV. 861. 
7. See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 
(1976); Van Dyke, Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, 69 AM. POL. Sc,. REV. 607 (1975). 
8. See, e.g., Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1195-200 
(1982); Yudof, School .Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science 
Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 57. 
9. See, e.g., Kirp, Legalism and Politics in School .Desegregation, 1981 W1s. L. REV. 924 
(discussing the political aspects of implementing school desegregation); Yudof, Implementation 
Theories and .Desegregation Realities, 32 ALA. L. REV. 441 (1980-1981). See generally M. Mc-
LAUGHLIN, EVALUATION AND REFORM: THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
Acr OF 1965, TITLE I (1975); Berman, The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation, 26 
PUB. POLY. 157 (1978); Elmore, Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy .Deci-
sions, 94 PoL. Sci. Q. 601 (1979); Elmore, Organizational Models of Social Program Implemen-
tation, 26 PUB. POLY. 185 (1978). 
10. See Diver, The Judge as Political Power Broker, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979). 
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vate law claims (e.g., contracts, torts, and property) and more controversial 
constitutional and statutory litigations in such diverse areas as reapportion-
ment, school desegregation, and employment discrimination. The new 
model clarifies the often heated debates over standing, class actions, ripe-
ness, and mootness by revealing that the antagonists often hold widely dis-
parate views as to the nature of the judicial process. 11 But equally as 
important, Chayes' analysis poses problems for those defending and advo-
cating an expansive role for the judiciary. If courts are to engage in broad 
factfinding to decide multipolar disputes, and to participate in the fashion-
ing of broad remedies oriented to the future, are they not acting as legisla-
tive bodies? How competent are courts to engage in such tasks? What do 
courts know about interpreting social science evidence?12 Do the parties 
before courts represent the full range of interests in a policy area? Is not the 
adversarial process too piecemeal for the articulation of broad policy? How 
can courts monitor and enforce decrees requiring widespread cooperation 
and institutional action? In short, do courts have the institutional capability 
to perform the tasks assigned to them or assumed by them under the public 
interest litigation model? 13 
Capability, of course, is not unrelated to legitimacy of authority. Defer-
ence is frequently accorded those who exercise authority wisely. For exam-
ple, patients may allow physicians to exercise authority over their care 
because they think that physicians know best, that they make good deci-
sions, that they provide needed treatment in a highly skilled manner. 14 Sim-
ilarly, if courts are discharging their new responsibilities well, this may be a 
reason to continue to assign those responsibilities to courts. Chayes said as 
much in his public law litigation article, cryptically defending judicial activ-
ism on instrumental grounds. 15 
But the ache of judicial review in a democracy does not go away so 
easily. Tyrants may also make sound decisions; the trains may run on time; 
the economy and standard of living may improve. But the exercise of au-
thority, however capably or wisely, may be illegitimate. As Robert Dahl 
and Charles Lindblom have stated, democracy requires that citizens have 
the "last say," that they have the real ability to select leaders and influence 
policy decisions. The "First Problem of Politics . . . is the antique and yet 
ever recurring problem of how citizens can keep their rulers from becoming 
tyrants."16 While it may be fatuous to believe that a majority of citizens 
actually approves of every decision made by public officials, the consent of 
the governed requires, at a minimum, a process of consultation between 
leaders and the citizenry, a process that legitimates the exercise of 
11. See generally Chayes, Foreword· Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 4 (1982); Rhode, supra note 8. 
12. See, eg., Wolf, Nor/hem School JJesegregation and Residential Choice, 1977 SUP. CT. 
REV. 63. 
13. See references in note 2 supra. See also Diver, supra note 10; Glazer, Should Judges 
Administer Social Services?, 50 Pua. INTEREST 64 (1978); Kirp, supra note 9; Note, Implemen• 
/ation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977). 
14. See C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 18 (1977). 
15. See Chayes, supra note 3, at 1313-16. 
16. R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 273, 276 (1976). 
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authority.17 
In riveting our attention to the new breed of public interest litigation, 
Professor Chayes takes us beyond the capability question, and reopens the 
traditional debate over the legitimacy of courts entertaining such litigations. 
As law suits begin to resemble, less and less, traditional bipolar litigations, 
one significant justification for judicial review begins to fade. Chief Justice 
Marshall argued 180 years ago that "[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the 
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that 
rule." 18 In part, he defended judicial review on the ground that the judici-
ary must interpret and apply the Constitution and laws, as duly enacted, if 
it were charged with the responsibility of deciding concrete cases. Many 
have disagreed with Marshall, particularly with regard to the finality of ju-
dicial review. 19 But what if, as Chayes' analysis suggests, courts were decid-
ing matters of broad public policy in the absence of a "case" or "law" in the 
traditional sense? Is the exercise of judicial authority legitimate under such 
circumstances?20 
In responding to such quandaries, Rebell and Block move beyond the 
utilitarian defense of Chayes, perhaps sensing that utility alone is not 
enough21 and that, in any event, there are conflicting views as to the efficacy 
of the courts' work in public interest cases. They re}y upon the theories of 
Herbert Wechsler22 and Ronald Dworkin23 for the proposition that "[t]o 
the extent that courts decide issues in terms of 'principles,' they are acting 
within the proper sphere of judicial decision making; to the extent that they 
decide issues in terms of 'policies,' they are, according to the critics, intrud-
ing into the legislative or executive domain" (p. 23). Strangely enough, 
there is not much elaboration by the authors as to how principled judicial 
decisionmaking enhances the legitimacy of the exercise of judicial author-
ity. They largely limit themselves to quoting from Dworkin: 
[T]he line between "principle" and "policy'' is difficult to establish. . . . 
Nevertheless, we agree with Dworkin that "the direction to these judges to 
decide cases on grounds of principle cannot have the same effect that the 
direction to decide on grounds of policy would have." [P. 23.] 
17. As Charles Frankel put it, 
"Government by consent" cannot be interpreted to mean that those who are governed 
necessarily agree with what their rulers decide to do. Nor can it mean that "the majority" 
agrees. For in a democracy the minority, too, is presumably governed by its consent. But 
to speak of majorities and minorities and the inevitability of disagreements is to suggest 
what "government by consent" expresses. It expresses the hope for a society in which 
ordinary people can influence the actions their leaders take . . . . [T]hey are required to 
obey only after having been actively consulted by those who issue the orders. 
C. FRANKEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 34 (1962). 
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See also THE FEDERALIST, 
No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
19. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9-10 (1958). 
20. See Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
J)ream, l l GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
21. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
22. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
23. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 21. 
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The same assertion is made at a number of other points in the book (e.g. , 
pp. xi-xii, 7, 201). 
The failure to elaborate on principled decisionmaking is unfortunate. 
This is evident in the commingling of the theories of Wechsler and Dwor-
kin. Presumably, the requirements of neutral principles and reasoned elab-
oration of those principles in judicial opinions reflect the notion that 
judicial power should not be exercised in the same manner as legislative 
power. The corollary assumption is that the expertise of courts lies in artic-
ulating and applying neutral principles, that they have been delegated re-
sponsibility to resolve controversies by reasoning by example or analogy in 
accordance with "a coherent body of principled rules."24 And, more than 
that, the principles and applications should be embedded in a "comprehen-
sive system," a commitment that Lon Fuller argued leads to reliance on 
"legal fictions."25 
The mode of decisionmaking required of courts is, in some loose sense, 
a substitute for the substantive and procedural rules adopted by elective 
bodies to control discretion in government bureaucracies.26 But neutrality 
of principle cannot suffice. As the late Alexander Bickel noted, it leaves the 
"hardest questions" unanswered: ''Which values, among adequately neu-
tral and general ones, qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or 
whathaveyou to be vindicated by the Court against other values affirmed by 
legislative acts?"27 The contribution of Dworkin to the debate, in the au-
thors' words, is his argument that "legal rights may be based not only on a 
discrete set of applicable precedents and statutes, but also on justifying 
principles derived from institutional structures and morality, and political 
theories integrating the two" (p. 9). 
A legitimate principle needs to be more than general and neutral; it 
needs to be derived from a legitimate source. Otherwise, the principle itself 
is illegitimate. Thus, the legitimacy of judicial activism in constitutional 
litigation cannot be determined, absent agreement on a theory of constitu-
tional interpretation that identifies legitimate sources for principles. But the 
authors do not propound such a theory. They do not respond to Dworkin's 
many critics.28 They do not pick a point on the continuum from Thomas 
Grey's unwritten constitution29 to Raoul Berger's search for original intent 
in text and history.30 They appear agnostic about the nature of the princi-
ples they examine. 
By virtue of its conceptualization, the study then is largely limited to 
comparing the decisionmaking approaches of legislative and judicial bod-
ies, and, as the authors admit, the results are inconclusive as to the legiti-
macy of judicial activism (p. 25). Even assuming that courts and litigants 
frame policy arguments in terms of principle, a natural tendency if they are 
24. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25 (1962). 
25. L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 49-53 (1967). 
26. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); T. Low1, THE END OF LIBER· 
ALISM (2d ed. 1979); P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969). 
27. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 55. 
28. See, e.g., Greenawalt,Poliry, Rights, and Judicial JJecision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991 (1977), 
29. See Grey, JJo We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 21 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
30. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). 
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to avoid charges of usurpation of authority, and assuming further that poli-
cies and principles can be distinguished in hard cases (a point the authors 
found sticky), the inferences to be drawn are quite limited. Educational Pol-
icy Making and the Courts tells us more about the differences in how courts 
and legislatures approach problems, and how the authors approach courts 
and legislatures, than it does about the legitimacy ?f judicial activism. 
II 
The major empirical component of Educational Policy Making and the 
Courts is a study of 65 randomly selected education cases litigated in fed-
eral district courts between 1970 and 1977 (p. 21). Individual document 
files were assembled for each of the "caselets," and researchers reviewed 
court opinions, key pleadings, briefs, and other materials from court files (p. 
224). In 60 of the 65 cases, the researchers were able to interview the attor-
neys for the principal parties (p. 225). The authors constructed a set of 
questions to be answered for each caselet, and reports were drafted by re-
searchers under the direction of the principal investigators (pp. 224-25). 
These questions ranged from straightforward requests for information (for 
example, did the court retain jurisdiction over the case and for how long?) 
to more difficult qualitative evaluations of the claims and their resolution 
(for example, what was the degree of compliance with the court's order, and 
how novel was plaintiff's legal theory?). The authors present the results of 
the caselet studies in four chapters, each of which deals with a particular 
aspect of legitimacy or capability: "Principle/Policy Issues" (chapter 2), 
"Interest Representation Issues (chapter 3), "Fact-finding Capability Is-
sues" (chapter 4), and "Remedial Capability Issues" (chapter 5). These 
chapters occupy about fifty pages and are crisply organized and written, 
with a "summary of findings" at the end of each. 
The caselet analysis is supplemented by two detailed comparative case 
studies of legislative and judicial decisionmaking in the education sphere, 
and these two case studies take up more than twice as many pages as the 
more quantitatively oriented summaries of the caselet findings. The New 
York study concerns judicial and legislative responses to disputes between 
those seeking to increase the proportion of minority teachers and principals 
in New York City public schools and those committed to traditional hiring 
practices, seniority rules, and lay-off procedures. The second case study 
focuses on the recent bilingual-bicultural education controversy in Colo-
rado, and the efforts of Mexican-Americans to alter the curriculum in pub-
lic schools and to secure the hiring of more Mexican-American personnel. 
Four chapters are devoted to the case studies. They are rich in detail, and 
give the reader a feel for the complexity and subtleties of public interest 
litigation that, inevitably, cannot be obtained from the caselets. At the con-
clusion of each chapter, the authors analyze their research from the per-
spectives of principle/policy, interest representation, factfinding, and 
remedial issues, and, with few exceptions, the findings are broadly consis-
tent with the findings for the caselet study. 
The discussion of interest representation issues is, in some ways, the 
most puzzling aspect of the book. To the extent that all interested parties 
are represented in a public interest litigation, this would appear to reflect 
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more on the capability of courts in adjudicating such matters than on the 
legitimacy of their doing so. That is true if one eschews utilitarian defenses 
oflegitimacy,31 as the authors do. That is, if the court is aware of all of the 
benefits and costs of a decision, that decision is more likely to be correct 
and workable. The authors, on the other hand, argue that 
[t]o the extent that courts today engage in . . . policy deliberations, the 
legitimacy of their actions is clearly undermined if (as under the traditional 
bipolar model) a limited number of litigants speak only for their particular 
interests and the courts receive no direct input concerning the perspectives 
or needs of the majority of citizens who might be affected by a wide-rang-
ing decree. [P. 9.] 
The authors' perspective on interest representation suggests theories of 
legitimacy apart from, and perhaps inconsistent with, the principle/policy 
dichotomy. Wider interest representation is relevant to legitimacy only if 
one believes that it enhances accountability (gives citizens something like 
the "last word") or that democracy entails giving minorities, under-
represented in legislative bodies, the opportunity to check majoritarian ex-
cesses through the judicial process.32 It is as if the authors are saying that 
courts should engage in principled decisionmaking, but if they depart from 
principle and fashion policy, that too is appropriate so long as courts con-
sider all of the relevant interests and issues. Principled decisions, derived 
pursuant to an acceptable theory of judicial review, would not necessarily 
require broad interest representation, except insofar as principles may be 
accommodated or blunted by the likely consequences of their application. 
A majority of the sixty-five cases in the sample were brought by minor-
ity individuals or groups, and these plaintiffs tended to prevail more fre-
quently than "other'' plaintiffs (p. 42). This is not surprising and is 
consistent with the view that judicial review protects interests thought to be 
at risk in pluralistic political processes, and that this is a legitimate function 
for courts. Nonetheless, as the authors admit (p. 36), the fact that minority 
groups frequently prevail in the courts does not necessarily mean that they 
do not have "fair access to the legislative process" (p. 36). Minority indi-
viduals and groups may tum to courts to maximize their chances of success 
even in circumstances where they are not frozen out oflegislative processes. 
Further, the frequency of minority success in court tells us little about 
whether decisions are principled, and may run counter to the proposition 
that courts are aware of and respond to the "needs of the majority of citi-
zens" (p. 9). 
The treatment of other interest representation issues is provocative. In 
seventy-one percent of the cases, the plaintiffs requested certification of a 
class, but such certification was granted in less than half of the cases (pp. 
42-43). In many cases, the court simply ignored or neglected these requests, 
and in a smaller percentage of cases the requests were denied outright, 
largely on technical grounds (pp. 42-43). Perhaps these statistics indicate a 
desire to represent broadly a large class, but as the authors correctly note, 
there is little evidence to suggest that judges are taking meaningful meas-
31. See generally Rhode, supra note 8, at 1200-01. 
32. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 129-
70 (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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ures in education cases to assure themselves of the representativeness of the 
plaintiffs claims (p. 38). Nor does pursuit of class action status necessarily 
suggest that public interest attorneys address their clients' preferences 
rather than their own philosophical predilections33 (p. 42). Courts, how-
ever, do tend to grant motions for joinder, intervention, or amicus status, 
and a majority of the cases involved multiple plaintiffs or defendants or 
groups. But courts did not encourage additional interests to participate, 
perhaps fearing that more participants would bring more complexity and 
delay to the litigation. The authors surmise that some interests and per-
spectives may not have been represented in these judicial proceedings (p. 
43). Whatever the consequences for Chayes' "new model" litigation, the 
authors reach the striking conclusion that legislatures and courts are 
equally adept or inept in terms of canvassing the different interests and is-
sues in their decision making processes.34 And the nature of the contro-
versy, "rather than [the] ... inherent institutional characteristics of the 
judicial or legislative forums," appears to determine the "breadth and depth 
of interest representation" (pp. 193-94). 
With regard to factfinding capability issues, Educational Policy Making 
and the Courts should do much to dispel the myth that courts are less capa-
ble than legislative bodies in eliciting and analyzing factual information. 
When one reads the critical evaluations of the judicial process emanating 
from social scientists, one often imagines legislative bodies with extensive 
staffs drawn from eminent scholars of the Brookings Institution or the Rand 
Corporation and hapless courts mired in nineteenth-century rules of evi-
dence and procedure.35 Attorneys work diligently to suppress or distort 
facts, the adversary process reveals only a small slice of the larger pie of 
information that should undergird decisions, and judges, untutored in sta-
tistics and social science methodologies, ignore the revealed truths of social 
science. Legislators, while imperfect, attend more closely to the facts, to the 
difficulties in implementing legal mandates, and to the relationships among 
policy areas. This "conventional wisdom" is contrary to the experiences of 
many who have participated in judicial and legislative proceedings. 
Rebell and Block show that judges, particularly federal judges in public 
interest litigations, appear anxious to illuminate the issues with facts, the 
discovery process is usually quite extensive, and social scientists are fre-
quently enlisted to offer testimony on the heady issues before the court. 
Without juries, there is a tendency to consider virtually any piece of evi-
dence proffered by the parties. The parties, anxious to bolster their posi-
33. See generally Dell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School .Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976) (discussing the potential conflict be-
tween the client's desires and the attorney's ideology); Rhode, supra note 8, at 1293-94. 
34. The New York comparative study demonstrates that the same groups tend to partici-
pate in the legislative and judicial processes with respect to particular education issues, albeit 
minority groups were more influential in the court proceedings. Pp. 141-42. In Colorado, the 
comparative pattern of representation was the same, but in both forums the controversy was 
bipolar, largely pitting Mexican-American organizations and legislators against more con-
servative state officials and legislators. Interestingly, plaintiffs prevailed in the Colorado legis-
lature and lost in federal court. The authors swallow hard and admit that the Colorado 
experience is an "exception" to their hypotheses about minority access to legislative bodies. P. 
193. 
35. See notes 2 & 12, supra. 
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tions, happily seize on supportive social science research, often in a knee-
jerk manner. 36 The authors have the impression that judges are quite atten-
tive to the evidence, albeit they tend to challenge the efficacy or relevance of 
social science offerings. By way of contrast, legislatures often have inade-
quate staffs, and individual legislators may rush to judgment without being 
fully apprised of the issues and facts. In my experience, legislative hearings 
are more ritualistic than court hearings. Each side calls its witnesses, and 
testimony often is sought more to generate public and media support for or 
opposition to a bill than it is to inform decision making. Rather than crafty 
cross-examination, hostile witnesses may be greeted with silence or the ab-
sence of members of the committee. In short, legislative proceedings may be 
as adversarial as court proceedings, and yet allow for a less orderly and less 
meticulous evaluation of the facts. This is not to say that either judges or 
legislators are adept at analyzing complicated facts (both often misinterpret 
social science findings), nor is it to suggest the legitimacy of courts exercis-
ing broad authority to settle policy disputes. But in an effort to lop off every 
head of the hydra-headed monster of judicial activism, critics too fre-
quently distort this capability question in an effort to bolster their position 
on the legitimacy issue. 
The authors are adept at demonstrating the comparative competence of 
courts with respect to factfinding issues, but they do so primarily through 
elaboration of caselets (pp. 45-46) or the longer case studies.37 In one case, 
for example, a cooperative discovery process generated all the data required 
for extensive social science studies by both parties.38 In particular, Rebell 
and Block argue that public agencies often felt an obligation to disclose 
information relating to broad questions of educational policy (p. 46). Fur-
ther, as the New York case study demonstrates,judges are able to chide the 
parties into doing the leg-work to provide additional data necessary to the 
adjudication of the suit (p. 143). They suggest that courts compensate for 
their own lack of staff resources "by inducing the parties themselves to 
gather and submit the necessary information" (p. 143). 
With regard to the treatment of social science evidence, the authors were 
unable to demonstrate that attentiveness to such evidence leads to reliance 
on it. Judges rarely based their decision on the testimony of social scientists 
(p. 37). Rather judges tended to employ various "avoidance devices" to 
resolve social science controversies. This is not surprising. Courts may 
have a healthy desire to rest their decisions on narrow grounds, leaving the 
broader issues to the political process. Citation to policy studies often leads 
36. See Yudof, supra note 8. 
37. The quantitative analysis yields precious few insights into the factfinding process. For 
example, it is not clear what inferences one should draw from the statistics showing that formal 
discovery requests were made in 38 of the 65 cases and that courts ruled on the fairness of 
discovery in only 7 cases. P. 45. 
38. Brown v. Board of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974), an intra-district school 
financing suit brought in Chicago, indicates how discovery may be used to aid in the decision-
making process. The school district supplied plaintiffs with extensive records on expenditure 
patterns and staffing, and the plaintiffs used these records to provide the data for analysis by 
experts. The reports of plaintiffs' experts were turned over to the defendants, and defendants' 
experts reanalyzed the data and fashioned their own reports. The cooperative process of ex-
changing information led to agreement on a number of factual issues. P. 45. 
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to charges of "social engineering." And, as Lindblom and Cohen, 39 among 
others,40 have noted, social science evidence does not resolve difficult nor-
mative questions, it supplements but does not supersede "ordinary knowl-
edge,"41 and frequently it does not converge around a single perspective on 
a problem (that is, it poses more questions than it answers).42 The unwill-
ingness to rely upon social science evidence may also indicate a devotion to 
principle, and the absence of relevant and persuasive research. Its actual 
influence may be indirect and incremental over long periods of time, as 
findings become a part of "ordinary knowledge." 
Even if courts can be faulted for ignoring the findings of students of 
public policy, the shortcoming is widespread among public officials, includ-
ing legislators. Consider what Rebell and Block have to say about the Col-
orado legislature's consideration of bilingual education issues. Expert 
testimony "primarily served a showcase function," which interviews with 
legislators confirmed "did not significantly shape the final outcome" (p. 
194). Alas, Educational Policy Making and the Courts is fully consistent 
with the conclusion of Lindblom and Cohen that "in public policy making, 
many suppliers and users of social research are dissatisfied, the former be-
cause they are not listened to, the latter because they do not hear much they 
want to listen to."43 
The interesting question, of course, is what inferences should be drawn 
from the authors' comparative analysis of factfinding and decisionmaking 
in courts and legislatures. Are courts "better" decisionmakers than legisla-
tive bodies? What does one mean by better? This critical point will be 
discussed more fully below. For present purposes it suffices to note that the 
authors perceive the judicial process as being more analytical, more atten-
tive to the evidence, more systematic and more comprehensive.44 
39. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE ch. 4 (1979). 
40. See, e.g., Cahn,Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955); Yudof,supra note 8. See 
generally EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (R. Rist & R. Anson eds. 
1972). 
41. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 39, at 35. 
42. Id. at 47. See also Cohen & Weiss, Social Science and Social Policy: Schools and 
Race, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 40, at 72. 
43. Id. at I. 
44. For example, in comparing the two forums in Colorado, the authors state that 
[t]he legislative experience in Colorado revealed a ... pattern of lack of capacity for 
systematic fact-gathering or analytical fact analysis. Particularly striking in this regard is 
the contrast between the legislative deliberations and the Otero trial. . . . The court's 
decision was, for the most part, attentive to the evidence and based on specific factual 
findings. 
P. 194. And similarly, with regard to the New York legislature they observe that 
[i]t is often assumed . . . that legislatures, in comparison with the courts, possess an 
independent fact-gathering capability. Despite the New York State Legislature's high-
ranking staff resources, it does not actually provide sufficient resources for substantive 
investigation and research. . . . 
Consequently, the legislature, like the court, was left to rely on the parties to supply 
basic data .... 
. . . There was no pretense that evidence or expert testimony would be considered 
objectively and dispassionately ..•. [T]he legislature, by the very nature of its political 
approach, is even more strongly inclined toward avoiding basic social fact issues [than are 
the courts]. As a result, in this case, no factual record that could be subjected to scrutiny 
was ever produced. Thus, comparing the legislature's and the court's capabilities . . . is 
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The authors' empirical analysis of remedial capability issues is inconclu-
sive. There is some evidence produced by the authors that courts are disin-
clined to grant broad, systemic reform decrees, and that judges attempt to 
adhere, as circumstances permit, to more traditional remedies (pp. 59-60). 
But surely the percentage of cases classified as involving reform decrees 
does not tell us very much about the intrusiveness of judicial remedies. 
And intrusiveness itself is a legitimacy question and not primarily a capa-
bility question. Finally, the dearth of meaningful measures of compliance 
tends to obscure the significance of empirical studies on a phenomenon as 
difficult to define as it is to observe.45 I am skeptical that one can determine 
the degree of compliance with reform decrees simply by interviewing the 
attorneys, seventy-eight percent of whom indicated that there was "com-
plete compliance" with the court's order (p. 65).46 
Nor is the absence of contempt citations, duly noted by the authors, a 
bellwether for compliance (p. 70). Plaintiffs and their attorneys may not 
have the continuing interest, the tenacity, or the resources to monitor com-
pliance, and generally courts are dependent on the parties to produce evi-
dence of compliance or noncompliance. Even the extended case study of 
the Chance litigation47 in New York indicates little more than that the court 
was a catalyst for change, ended the stalemate over personnel policies, and 
gave some direction to the negotiations taking place among the interested 
parties (pp. 118-19). If the court was not overly intrusive, it was not overly 
successful either (pp. 119, 146). 
The most impressive aspect of Educational Policy Making and tire 
Courts is its exploration in the case studies of how remedies were formu-
lated in legislatures and courts. The authors, supporting Chayes' thesis, 
found that "the process of fashioning . . . a remedy was remarkably similar 
in the two forums" (p. 145). In the Chance litigation the fashioning of an 
appropriate "plan" was left to the parties, with the court mediating and 
largely beside the point, simply because the legislature did not even purport to obtain and 
assess such data. 
P. 144 (footnotes omitted). Thus, while the Rebell and Block research suggests that courts may 
be more capable of analyzing complex facts for decisionmaking, it also suggests that the pri-
mary distinction between courts and legislatures may be in their respective modes of solving 
policy problems. See generally Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1979) (arguing 
that Professor Tribe's rationalism should not be imposed on legislative decisionmaking). 
45. Students of implementation theory endlessly debate the meaning of compliance and 
how it should be measured. See Clune & Lindquist, Whal "Implemenlalion" Isn't: Toward A 
General Framework far Implementation Research, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1044,1066-72. Perhaps if 
the clearly identified goal is to ensure that 30% of a school district's teachers come from minor-
ity groups, compliance is not difficult to ascertain (p. 65). But if the goal is to provide an 
"appropriate education" to handicapped students, if the legislature had latent or conflicting 
objectives, or ifit intended to delegate broad authority while embracing only. symbolic reform, 
the difficulties of ascertaining compliance are manifest. See, e.g., id; Yudof, Legalization of 
J)ispute Resolution, J)istrust of Authority, and Organizational Theory: Implementing J)ue Pro-
cess far Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 891. Furthermore, defendants may 
comply with the letter but not the spirit of the law, e.g., by providing due process hearings to 
students charged with misconduct but not objectively and fairly considering the student's side 
of the story. 
46. See generally Kirp, supra note 9. 
47. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). For the barrage of 
additional opinions by the district and appellate courts, see pp. 262-63 n.13. 
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arbitrating disputes in those areas where they could not reach agreement. 
Similarly, the various interest groups negotiated with each other in the New 
York legislature, with the education committee breaking deadlocks (p. 145). 
In Colorado, representatives of the concerned groups met with key mem-
bers of the legislature and hammered out the provisions of the bilingual 
education bill (p. 195). Since in neither forum did public officials take pri-
mary responsibility for the remedy, the authors conclude that, in general, 
there is no basis for assuming that courts are less able than legislatures to 
deal with complex remedial issues affecting large-scale public institutions. 
They are subject "to the same strengths and weaknesses" (p. 145). 
Perhaps the critical point here is that at the remedial stage there is often 
no pretense, in either courts or legislatures, of principled decisionmaking in 
the sense that the remedy flows logically or analytically from the identified 
wrongs. The parties and interest groups, with different perceptions of the 
problem and of what needs to be done, may each attempt a logical ap-
proach to the remedial issues, but the final result is a function of bargaining 
and is unlikely to reflect a unitary analytical perspective. The only major 
distinction that the authors suggest is that the political bargaining process 
over judicial remedies is limited primarily to educational issues, whereas 
the legislature may engage in bargaining across many public programs, 
trading educational expenditures for reductions or increases in other service 
categories (pp. 195-96).48 They infer from this that the comprehensiveness 
of the legislative remedies in the education sphere "can be undermined as 
the process unfolds by the particularistic concerns of various political inter-
ests" (p. 195). Thus, according to Rebell and Block, the politics of remedies 
in courts blunts accusations of judicial intrusiveness and enhances the pros-
pects for compliance with an order, whereas in legislatures a similar polit-
ical process leads to a failure to scrutinize facts and compromises the 
comprehensiveness of the remedy. Ah, the perversity of politics. 
III 
In the last chapter, in what must have been an excruciating passage for 
Messieurs Rebell and Block to write, the authors candidly admit that their 
work may have proceeded on many wrong-headed assumptions (p. 215). 
Courts and legislatures are highly imperfect, but the available evidence 
does not suggest that courts are less capable than legislatures of canvassing 
the different interests, ascertaining the facts, interpreting social science evi-
dence, devising remedies, or implementing their decisions. There is plenty 
of ineptitude in the public sphere; neither courts nor legislatures have a 
monopoly. But in examining judicial activism, how relevant are the capa-
bility issues? Should we be concerned with the relative absence of principle 
in legislative deliberations? In other words, have the issues in the debate 
over judicial activism been appropriately framed? Rebell and Block think 
not. 
[T]he critical question, we now believe, is not whether the courts are "bet-
ter" or "more capable" fact-finders or implementers of remedies than are 
legislatures, but whether particular aspects of social problems should be 
handled through the principled, analytic judicial process or through the 
48. See Nagel, supra note 44, at 1192. 
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instrumental, mutual adjustment patterns of the legislatures. [P. 215, foot-
note .omitted.] 
The legislative process, while not uninfluenced by principles (particu-
larly the principles of individual members),49 is largely one of reconciling 
differences, of bargaining, of compromise.50 Information is highly relevant 
to the political process, "but such information need not be explored system-
atically nor related logically to the final outcome" (p. 208). The judicial 
process, on the other hand, aspires to analytic decisionmaking and to the 
justification of decisions in the light of principle, though the effort may fall 
short and politics and bargaining may influence the result (p. 208). If, as 
Alexander Bickel once opined, "[n]o good society can be unprincipled; and 
no viable society can be principle-ridden,"51 how should a democratic soci-
ety go about assigning policymaking responsibilities? 
This question is both broader and narrower than traditional inquiries 
into judicial activism. It is narrower in the sense that it assumes that princi-
pled judicial decisionmaking counters assertions that decisions of unelected 
federal judges, at least in constitutional litigations, are antidemocratic and 
hence illegitimate.52 This is hardly an incontestable proposition. Robert 
Nagel, for example, drawing on the philosophical writings of Michael 
Oakeshott,53 suggests that proponents of judicial review unconvincingly 
seek to justify the broad influence of constitutional law on public policy "by 
identifying rationalism with legitimacy, somewhat as the law generally 
tends to confuse good argument with good policy."54 Critical theorists, 
building on the nihilist elements of the legal realist tradition, see neutral 
principles and reasoned elaboration as subterfuges for accomplishing the 
objectives of liberal individualism.55 Legal theory allows judges to give 
their decisions a gloss of inevitability as a way of obscuring value judg-
ments and choices. 56 
The question is broader in that even democratic societies must choose 
between analytic or rational modes of decisionmaking and what Lindblom 
and Cohen describe as the "interactive" method of addressing policy 
problems.57 There may be no neat dividing line between the two. There 
may be agreement that neither principle nor political bargaining should 
govern all manner of decisionmaking. There may be advantages in institu-
tions with different modes of decisionmaking interacting with each other. 
But by some process (perhaps analytic, interactive, or both) particular types 
49. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975). See generally D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1966) (exploring the interaction of constitutional principles and politics). 
50. See Nagel, supra note 44, at 1191-93. 
51. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 64. 
52. Seeid 
53. M. OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS (1962). 
54. Nagel, supra note 44, at 1183. 
55. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). 
56. See, e.g., Tushnet,Deviant Science in Constitutional Law, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 815 (1981); 
Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship In 
the Seventies, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1307 (1979). But see P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 
(1982). 
57. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 39, at 20. 
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of problems or issues will be thought to be better suited to one mode of 
problem solving or the other.58 And this is true even if federal judges stood 
for election every five years or if their constitutional decisions were subject 
to congressional revision. 
Charles Lindblom and David Cohen, in their extraordinary work, Usa-
ble Knowledge, 59 amplify many of these themes. They compare a policy 
process designed to enable policy makers to understand problems and to 
solve them through analysis with the interactive model, the stimulation of 
action "so that the preferred outcome comes about without anyone's having 
analyzed the given problem or having achieved an analyzed solution."60 
There is no strict dichotomy, but the difference in emphasis is clear: 
Strictly speaking, since people never stop thinking the alternatives are a 
frontal analytical attack on some identified problem, or interaction in 
which thought or analysis is adapted to the interaction and is therefore on 
some issues displaced by interaction.61 
For example, even if each voter is well-informed and thoughtful, there is a 
difference between a single person or body deciding on who should be Pres-
ident, in the light of certain objectives and means-ends relationships, and 
the aggregation of individual preferences through the interaction of elec-
tions. The ultimate choice of a President, in a sense, may be "irrational," 
but in another sense the choice has simply been made by another means of 
decisionmaking.62 So, too, the behavior of buyers and sellers in the market-
place may solve allocation of resources problems, albeit resources may also 
be allocated by planners employing a "frontal analytical" approach. 63 
The problem is that those who aspire to rationality, whether judges· or 
policy analysts, may tend to treat interactional politics or bargaining as ille-
gitimate, as atavistic, or as simply perverse.64 Lindblom and Cohen quote 
58. The distinction between interactive and rational decisionmaking has been discussed by 
a number of prominent scholars. Charles Lindblom, in a famous article, has compared the 
"science of muddling through" to goal-oriented, instrumental problemsolving. Lindblom, The 
Science of "Muddling Through': 19 Pua. Ao. REV. 79 (1959). See also P. PETERSON, SCHOOL 
POLITICS CHICAGO STYLE 128-39 (1976). Wildavsky argues that politics and markets are gen-
erally preferable to decisionmaking by experts. A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: 
THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS (1980). Daniel Bell stresses that the "hopes of 
rationality" - "a rationality of means that are intertwined with ends and become adjusted to 
each other" - "necessarily falls before politics," bargaining among persons. D. BELL, THE 
COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 365 (1976). Bell casts doubt on Max Weber's notion 
of a progression toward rationality in advanced industrial nations, and argues that society is 
rebelling: "rationality, as an end, finds itself confronted by the cantankerousness of politics, 
the politics of interest and the politics of passion." Id. at 350, 366. Michael Oakeshott sug-
gests that "the objects of our desires are known to us in the activity of seeking them," and he 
decries the tendency to test and reject tradition and authority in the light of rationalist criteria. 
M. OAKESHOTT, supra note 54, at 58. See also Nagel, supra note 44, at 1183. Oakeshott, like 
the others, is not rejecting co=on sense or purposeful behavior or thinking; rather he is 
attacking the modem tendency to substitute instrumental reasoning, embedded in systems of 
thought (whether law, political science, or policy analysis), for bargaining, tradition, and other 
less analytical modes of making policy decisions. See id. at I 183. 
59. See text following note 39 supra. 
60. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 39, at 20. 
61. Id. at 20. 
62. Id. at 21-22. 
63. Id. at 22. 
64. See W. LIPPMANN, supra note I, at 261; Nagel, supra note 44. 
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numerous social scientists who view interactive problem solving as an ab-
beration, regretting the unwillingness of legislators and other policymakers 
to listen to reason.65 Similarly, consider the symbolic hubris in the "ra-
tional basis test" under the equal protection clause, the notion, at least theo-
retically, that laws may be declared unconstitutional because of the lack of 
fit between means and ends.66 Why is it not sufficient that the enacted law 
is the one that commanded a majority, that adjusted individual and group 
interests in a tolerable way, that reflected bargain and compromise? Per-
haps I have taken the rational basis test too seriously; for the test may veil 
other constitutional concerns. But the purported mode of analysis is troub-
lesome. Surely, it is one thing to reserve expressly a place for principle, to 
invalidate a law because it discriminates by race or violates the free exercise 
of religion, and it is quite another to suggest that laws fail because they fall 
short of meeting the analytical standards of judges. 
Educational Policy Making and the Courts falls perilously close to em-
bracing the hubris of rationality, of treating political processes as a linger-
ing perversion of collective decisionmaking. If legislators do not articulate 
clearly their objectives, if they respond to interests and not arguments, if 
they ignore information or do not consider it in a detached manner, it does 
not follow that the decision is necessarily "wrong" or inferior to judicial 
decisions.67 Legislatures, of course, are not mystically endowed with wis-
dom. Some legislative decisions may be worse than others; sometimes there 
may be a failure to recognize and address constitutional concerns; igno-
rance or prejudice may prevail.68 But there are advantages to "legislative 
'irrationality.' "69 Principle may legitimate decisions, but so may politics. 
And "politics is haggling, or else it is force.''70 
To some extent, Rebell and Block recognize these points. When all is 
said and done they are uncomfortable with some of the inferences that may 
be drawn from their study of comparative institutional capabilities. They 
have disarmed some of the critics of judicial activism, they have shown that 
courts are not bumbling fact-finders incapable of recognizing diverse inter-
ests or devising comprehensive remedies, but in so doing they have raised 
other issues. If courts bargain over remedies like legislatures, does this not 
65. C. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, supra note 39, at ch. 3. 
66. Nagel, supra note 44, at 1189-91. See generally P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 549-76 (2d ed. 1983). 
67. Nagel, supra note 44, at 1191-92. 
68. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. I 
(1980). 
69. Nagel, supra note 44, at 1192. 
If values need not be formally articulated and consistently pursued, legislators can serve 
many interests at once . • . . Legislators are free to respond to intensity as well as articu-
lateness • • . . Even if no objective is fully achieved, many groups can be partially satis-
fied and can therefore be expected to retain some sense of loyalty to the governmental 
process. Because negotiation and trading "across substantive fields" are encouraged, the 
hard sacrifices that different allocations of resources require are implicitly recog-
nize_d,- . • . Because compromise is necessary and abstract argument is of limited value, 
groups are encouraged to find the common ground in their positions, rather than to insist 
on apparently irreconcilable differences of principle. 
/ Id. at 1192-93. 
70. D. BELL, supra note 58, at 365. 
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establish capability at the price of undermining legitimacy? Paradoxically, 
the more competent courts are in adjusting interests, the more they may 
depart from the principled decisionmaking that is supposed to distinguish 
them from legislative bodies. If legislatures do not weigh the facts and ex-
amine issues analytically, does this mean that courts are superior deci-
sionmakers? But this conclusion undercuts democratic theory and elevates 
a new breed of philosopher kings, giving them unacceptable powers in a 
democracy. 
In the end, the authors do not claim that their study will change many 
minds on the issue of judicial activism (p. 216). Like Antoine de Saint Ex-
upery's Little Prince on the fourth planet, they understand that counting the 
stars does not yield their secrets or establish ownership.71 They see a need 
to reformulate the issues and to probe the boundaries of different modes of 
problem solving. If Rebell and Block did not grasp this point when they 
began this book many years and drafts ago, neither did many other legal 
scholars. And we should be grateful for their contribution; for they have 
laid the foundation for the work that needs to be done. 
71. A. DE SAINT ExuPERY, THE LITTLE PRINCE ch.13 (K. Woods trans. 1943). 
